XML access control policies involving updates may contain security flaws, here called inconsistencies, in which a forbidden operation may be simulated by performing a sequence of allowed operations. ACCOn implements i) consistency checking algorithms that examine whether a write-access control policy defined over a DTD is inconsistent and ii) repair algorithms that propose repairs to an inconsistent policy to obtain a consistent one.
MOTIVATION
XML access control has received much attention over the last years as the amount of sensitive XML data exchanged between applications is increasing. Access control techniques for XML data have been considered extensively for read-only queries [4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13] . However, the problem of controlling write access is relatively new and has not received much attention. An important problem in this context is the presence of a certain type of vulnerabilities, here called inconsistencies, that allow one explicitly forbidden update operation to be simulated by a sequence of allowed ones.
In general, an XML write-access control policy specifies the update actions a user can perform based on the syntax of the update and not its actual behavior. Thus, it is possible that a single update request which is explicitly forbidden by the policy can nevertheless be simulated by a sequence of more than one allowed update requests.
Consider for example the XML DTD in Fig. 1 that describes patient data. A patient has a name and is associated with zero or more treatments. A treatment consists of a drug that was prescribed to the patient and that can be one of placebo, presDrug (prescription) and OTC (off-the-counter) drug, a diagnosis and the date of a patient's visit. The XML document shown in Fig. 2(a) is an instance of the hospital DTD shown in Fig. 1 . The document can be updated and queried by different users, e.g., doctors, nurses, administrators. A user is allowed to perform certain updates or access only part of the data. For example, a nurse is allowed to Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. insert and delete patients, but she cannot modify a patient's diagnosis or change a prescription drug to an off-the-counter drug. It is easy to see that the diagnosis of a patient can be changed by deleting a patient record and then inserting it back again with a modified value of diagnosis. Thus, a forbidden update request can be achieved by a sequence of allowed ones. We call an access control policy with this characteristic inconsistent.
It is important to be able to detect inconsistencies and suggest possible ways of repairing policies in order to ensure their consistency. We addressed this problem in [5] for a particular class of inconsistencies in XML write-access control policies, where we: i) provided a formal definition of consistency ii) showed that checking consistency for the studied type of access policies is in ptime iii) developed a polynomial time algorithm for checking consistency and iv) suggested repair algorithms for fixing the detected inconsistencies.
In this demo, we will present ACCOn, a system that implements the consistency checking and repair algorithms proposed in [5] and [6] .
The outline of this demonstration proposal is the following: in Section 2 we introduce some basic concepts about XML write-access control. In Section 3 we explain when an access control policy is inconsistent and using the ongoing example we present alternative algorithms to find possible repairs. Finally, in Section 4 we describe the demonstration's objectives.
PRELIMINARIES
DTDs and XML Documents. We consider structured XML DTDs as discussed in [9] . Although not all DTDs are syntactically representable in this form, one can (as argued A DTD D consists of a finite set of element types Ele, a distinguished type rt in Ele called the root type and a function Rg that maps a given element type A to a regular expression of the form Rg(A) := str | ǫ | B1, . . . , Bn | B1 + . . . + Bn | B1 * . The Bi ∈ Ele are distinct, ",", "+" and " * " stand for concatenation, disjunction and Kleene star respectively, ǫ for the EMPTY element content and str for text values. A DTD can be represented as a directed acyclic graph that we call DTD graph. In it, conjunctions and disjunctions are represented by solid and dashed lines respectively.
We call A → Rg(A) the production rule for A. An element type Bi that appears in the production rule of an element type A is called the subelement type of A. The production rules for the DTD graph shown in Fig. 1 are:
We model an XML document t as a rooted tree. An XML document is said to be valid w.r.t an XML DTD D, if it conforms to the constraints (i.e., production rules) defined by D. It is easy to see that the XML document shown in Fig. 2(a) is valid w.r.t the DTD of Fig. 1 .
XML Updates. There have been several XML update language proposals [3, 7, 15, 16, 17] . In ACCOn, we consider the delete, replace and insert update operations proposed in the XQuery Update Facility document [7] . In our context, an update operation is applied to a set of nodes specified by an XPath target expression. In a delete operation, target specifies the XML nodes to be deleted together with their descendants. The insert and replace operations have an additional component called source that is an XML tree or a text value. For the insert operation, target determines the node to which source will be inserted as a child node. Finally in the case of replace operations target specifies the node whose subtree will be replaced by source.
Examples of the update operations on the XML tree shown in Fig. 2 (a) are shown below. The resulting XML document is shown in Fig. 2 (b).
<name>Mrs. Liu</name> For the purpose of our work, we abstract from the syntax of the XQuery operations and we consider atomic update operations. These operate on the XML nodes obtained by evaluating the target expression of an update operation on the document in question. A delete(n) operation deletes node n and all its descendants. A replace(n, t) operation will replace the subtree with root n by the tree t. A replace(n, s) operation will replace the text value of node n with string s. There are several types of insert operations, but since we consider unordered XML trees, we deal only with insert into(n, t) (for readability purposes, we are going to write insert(n, t)) which inserts the root of t as child of n. We also consider update sequences op1; . . . ; opn with the standard semantics:
is the document obtained by evaluating opi on tree t.
XML Write-Access Policies An access control policy consists of a set of rules or authorizations that determine whether a user is allowed to perform some action on the data. These rules can be either XPath-based or annotationbased. In this work we use update access types that are similar to the latter. We have based our access types on the XAcU annot language discussed in [10] . The language follows the idea of security annotations introduced in [9] to specify the access authorizations for XML documents in the presence of a DTD.
Given a DTD D, an update access type (UAT) defined over D is of the form i) (A, insert(B1)), ii) (A, replace(B1, B2)), iii) (A, replace(str, str)) or iv) (A, delete(B1)) where A is an element type in D, and B1 and B2 are distinct subelement types of A.
For our XML DTD shown in Fig. 1 and for the update privileges of nurses that were discussed in the motivating example, we can write the following update access types:
(hospital, insert (patient)) (drug,replace (presDrug,OTC )) (hospital, delete (patient)) (diagnosis, replace (str,str)) Intuitively, an UAT represents a set of atomic update operations. For example, the UAT (hospital, insert(patient)) Set of Allowed UATs A A1:(treatments, insert(treatment)) A2:(drug, replace(OTC , presDrug)) A3:(drug, replace(presDrug, OTC )) A4:(drug, replace(placebo, OTC )) A5:(OTC , replace(str, str)) A6:(date, replace(str, str)) A7:(hospital, insert(patient)) A8:(hospital, delete(patient)) Set of Forbidden UATs F F1:(treatments, delete(treatment)) F2:(drug, replace(presDrug, placebo)) F3:(drug, replace(placebo, presDrug)) F4:(drug, replace(OTC , placebo)) F5:(name, replace(str, str)) F6:(diagnosis, replace(str, str)) F7:(presDrug, replace(str, str)) Table 1 : Total policy P1 = (A, F ) consists of the set of updates that insert a tree with root patient as a child of node hospital. On the other hand, the update access type (drug, replace(presDrug, OTC )) represents the set of updates that replace a child of drug of type presDrug by a new node of type OTC .
We assume that the evaluation of an update operation on a tree that conforms to a DTD D results in a tree that conforms to D. Therefore, each update access type only makes sense for specific element types. For our example DTD, any valid XML document would contain a placebo, a presDrug or an OTC as a child node of a drug node, thus, an update that inserts an OTC node as a child of a drug node would result in a document that is not valid w.r.t the DTD. Hence, the UATs (drug, insert (OTC )), (drug,delete (OTC )) (patient,replace (name,treatments)) are not relevant for the hospital DTD. On the other hand, UATs (treatments , delete (treatment)) and (name, replace(str, str)) are relevant. We say that a UAT is valid w.r.t a DTD D if one of the following holds:
• (A, insert(B)) and A → B *
• (A, delete(B)) and A → B *
and i = j • (A, replace(str, str)) and A → str The set of valid UATs for a DTD D is denoted by valid(D). A security policy P is defined by a set of allowed A and forbidden F valid update access types, where A ∩ F = ∅ (no UAT can be allowed and forbidden at the same time) and A ∪ F = valid(D). Intuitively, an update is allowed by a policy P = (A, F ) if the update access type uat that represents the update is allowed in the policy, this is, if uat ∈ A. Table 1 shows the set of allowed and forbidden UATs for policy P1 = (A, F ) for the hospital DTD. The update replace //drug[OTC = "Aspirin"] with <drug><placebo/> </drug>)) is not allowed by P1 since the update is represented by F4.
CONSISTENCY AND REPAIRS

Consistency
A policy defined over a DTD D is said to be consistent if for every XML document that conforms to D it is impossible to simulate a forbidden update through a sequence of allowed updates.
Policy P1 = (A, F ) shown in Table 1 is inconsistent for several reasons: I1: Even though it is forbidden to change the value of a name node, child of a patient node (F5), one can delete the latter and then insert a patient node (allowed by A8 and A7 resp.) with a changed value for the name node. I2: It is possible to change the value of presDrug node (for- bidden by F7), by replacing the presDrug node with an OTC node, and then this with a presDrug node with a changed value (allowed by A3 and A2 resp.). I3: Finally, one can replace a placebo with a presDrug node (forbidden by F3) by replacing a placebo with an OTC node (allowed by A4) and then this with a presDrug node (allowed by A2). Inconsistency I1 is an insert/delete inconsistency. I2 and I3 are called replace inconsistencies. The first kind of inconsistencies arise when the policy allows one to insert and delete nodes of some element type A whilst forbidding some operation in a descendant element type of A. It is evident that in this case, the forbidden operation can be simulated by first deleting a node, instance of element type A and then inserting a new node, instance of A after having done the necessary modifications (see Fig. 3 ).
The replace inconsistencies arise in presence of replace operations for an element type A whose production rule is of the form A → B1 + · · · + Bn. There are two kinds of inconsistencies: the forbidden-transitivity and negative-cycle. The former happens in the case in which we are allowed to replace Bi by Bj and Bj by B k but not Bi by B k . Then one can simulate the latter operation by a sequence of the first two (inconsistency I3). The latter occurs when we are allowed to replace some element type Bi with an element type Bj and vice versa. If some operation in the subtree of either Bi or Bj is forbidden, then it is evident that one can simulate the forbidden operation by a sequence of allowed operations, leading to an inconsistency (inconsistency I2).
To check whether a policy contains insert/delete inconsistencies we build the marked graph of the XML DTD. In this graph a node A is marked either with "+" if no operation is forbidden for any descendant element type below A or with "−" if that is not the case. Also, if for nodes A and B in the DTD, both (A, insert(B)) and (A, delete(B)) are in A, and node A is marked with "−", then we also mark it with "⊥". This marked graph can be obtained by traversing the DTD graph starting from the nodes with out-degree 0. Fig. 4 shows the marked DTD for policy P1 in Table 1 . The element type hospital is marked with both "−" and "⊥" since (a) one can delete and insert patients (A8 and A7) but (b) one cannot delete a treatment of a patient (F1).
To find replace inconsistencies we build the replace graph for each element type with a production rule A → B1 + . . . + Bn. The graph contains an edge between Bi and Bj if (A, replace(Bi, Bj)) ∈ A. It is easy to see that node A has no replace inconsistencies if i) the replace graph is transitive and ii) none of the elements involved in cycles in the replace graph is marked with "−". The replace graph for drug is shown in Fig. 5 and confirms that P1 is inconsistent since the graph is not transitive and presDrug is in a cycle but the update access type (presDrug, replace(str, str)) is forbidden (F7). It is easy to see that we can check whether a policy has no insert/delete and replace inconsistencies in ptime [5] using standard graph algorithms.
Repairs
If a policy is inconsistent, we would like to suggest possible minimal ways of modifying it in order to restore consistency. In other words, we would like to find a repair that is as close as possible to the inconsistent policy. More specifically, we want to obtain repairs by changing a minimal number of UATs from allowed to forbidden. We believe such repairs are a useful special case, since the repairs are guaranteed to be more restrictive than the original policy.
A possible repair for the policy P1 shown in Table 1 consists in forbidding the UATs (hospital, delete (patient)) and (drug, replace (OTC , presDrug)).
Repair Algorithms: The problem of deciding whether it exists a repair that removes less than k UATs from the allowed operations is np-complete. Thus, in order to find repairs, we will need to use approximation algorithms that will return a repair which is not necessarily minimal.
In this demonstration we will present the repair algorithms proposed in [5] and [6] .
The algorithm to compute a repair of a policy relies on the independence between insert/delete and replace inconsistencies. In fact, a local repair of an inconsistency w.r.t. insert/delete operations will never solve nor create an inconsistency with respect to a replace operation and vice-versa.
In the case of insert/delete inconsistencies the algorithm for finding the repairs is straightforward: we iterate over all nodes in the marked DTD, and if a node A (A → B * ) is marked with both "−" and "⊥" then we delete one of the (A,insert (B)) and (A, delete (B)) from the set of allowed UATs.
Finding the minimal repairs for replace inconsistencies is an np-complete problem, and unless p = np, there is no polynomial time algorithm to compute a minimal repair to the replace-inconsistencies. Therefore our algorithms run in polynomial time but compute a repair that is not necessarily minimal. We have developed two alternative algorithms to solve the replace inconsistencies. The first is the naive algorithm that does not find a minimal repair. It takes as input the replace graph for a node A and runs a modified version of the Floyd-Warshall algorithm.
A possible execution of the naive algorithm over the policy P1 of the hospital DTD, constructs the replace graph for element type drug (see Fig. 5 ). Then, since there are edges from placebo to OTC and from OTC to presDrug but there is no edge from placebo to presDrug, the algorithm randomly chooses one of the edges to be deleted. Say, for example, that it deletes the edge (placebo,OTC ). The algorithm continues and detects that there is a cycle between OTC and presDrug, and that presDrug is labeled with "−" in the marked DTD graph (see Fig. 4 ). Thus, one of the edges is randomly chosen to be deleted, say edge (OTC , presDrug). This implies that by removing (drug, replace(placebo, OTC )) and (drug, replace(OTC , presDrug)) the policy has no replace inconsistencies. Notice that this is not a minimal repair, since deleting (drug, replace(OTC , presDrug)) in the first step would have solved all replace inconsistencies.
Set Cover algorithm An alternative to the naive algorithm is an algorithm based on set cover. This algorithm computes, using the Floyd-Warshall algorithm, the transitive closure of the replace graph GA and labels each newly constructed edge e with a set of justifications J . Each justification contains the sets of edges of GA that were used to add e in the transitive graph. Also, if a node is found to be part of a negative-cycle, it is labeled with the justifications J of the edges in each cycle that contains the node. To avoid the potentially exponential number of justifications, the algorithm assigns at most J justifications to each edge or node, where J is a fixed number. This new labeled graph is then used to construct an instance of the minimum set cover problem (MSCP) [14] . The solution to this MSCP can be used to determine the set of edges to remove from GA to invalidate all of the justifications of inconsistencies. Because of the upper bound J on the number of justifications, it might be the case that the graph still has forbidden-transitivity or negative-cycles. Thus, the justifications have to be recomputed and the set cover run again until there are no more replace inconsistencies.
The first computation of justifications for J = 1 over policy P1 and element type drug results in the graph in Fig. 6 where the dashed edges are the ones needed for transitivity. The justifications for edges and nodes are: J (e4) = {{e1, e2}} and J (presDrug) = {{e2, e3}}. Each justification represents violations of transitivity or negative-cycles. If we want to remove the inconsistencies, it is enough to delete one edge from each set in J . The problem of removing one edge per justification in such a way that the total number of edges removed is minimal, can be reduced to the MSCP.
An instance of the MSCP consists of a universe U and a set S of subsets of U. A subset C of S is a set cover if the union of the elements in it is U. A solution of the MSCP is a set cover with the minimum number of elements.
The set cover instance used to repair the policy is obtained from the justifications. Intuitively, each element in U is a justification, and each set in S contains the justifications solved by removing a specific edge from the replace graph. The MSCP associated to the justifications for element type drug and policy P1 is given in Table 2 , where each column corresponds to a set in S and each row to an element in U. Values 1 and 0 in the table represent membership and non-membership respectively. The table shows, for example, that if edge e2 is deleted, then all the justifications are solved. In fact, the minimal set cover contains only the set associated to e2, namely {1, 1}. Thus, the solution obtained from the set cover algorithm shows that the replace inconsistencies can be solved by removing (drug, replace(OTC , presDrug)) from the allowed operations of P1. By putting together the changes suggested to solve insert/ delete and replace inconsistencies, a possible repair is obtained by changing from allowed to forbidden the following UATs: (hospital, delete (patient)) and (drug, replace(OTC , presDrug)) from allowed to forbidden.
The set cover problem is MAXSNP-hard [14] , but its solution can be approximated in polynomial time using a greedyalgorithm that can achieve an approximation factor of log(n) where n is the size of U. In our ongoing example, the greedy approximation algorithm would return the minimal solution.
DEMONSTRATION
Through the demo we are going to present the problem of checking the consistency of XML write-access control policies and show how one can repair such policies to obtain consistent ones. We believe that the development and demonstration of ACCOn is a promising step towards the study of the above problems that are still in their infancy.
In ACCOn the user will be able to choose from a set of possible XML DTDs and their associated XML writeaccess control policies. Amongst the DTDs that we will use are DBPL, Sigmod Record Data modified to fit our framework and other DTDs for different applications. During the demonstration i) we will show the DTD graph that marks possible inconsistencies and ii) propose changes to the policy. The user will then be able to select amongst the suggested changes, and ACCOn will apply the changes to the policy and check whether consistency is achieved. In the case in which the policy is not consistent, the process will be repeated until no more inconsistencies are found.
RELATED WORK
Many different consistency problems have been studied in the context of relational databases and XML. Minimal repairs are also used in the problem of returning consistent answers from inconsistent databases [1] . Also, consistency of XML Schemas, i.e. the existence of an XML document that conforms to a DTD and satisfies a set of constraints has been studied in [2] . However, we are aware of no previous work on consistency and repair for XML security policies.
Consistency is not an issue in security views [9] because security views consider only queries, not updates.
Our previous work [5] and [6] was the first to define and study semantic consistency properties of XML update access control policies. Since consistency checking and repair algorithms run at the schema level, scalability and heterogeneity at data level are not an immediate concern for our approach. ACCOn implements the algorithms presented in that work and allows users detect and repairing inconsistent security policies, thereby eliminating some security vulnerabilities that could lead to loss or damage to critical data.
